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Argumentation annotation is a crucial step in applying ma-
chine learning techniques to the argumentation field. How-
ever, there exist few argumentation corpora and their de-
velopment has not been studied in depth. In this paper
we present a study conducted during the creation of a legal
argumentation corpus. It shows how well-known argumen-
tation theories are used as the background framework of the
annotation process and which difficulties are found when
applying those theories to real argumentation. The aim of
the paper is to highlight different critical points humans en-
counter when applying theory to real argumentation, allow-
ing better and faster approaches in future annotation pro-
cesses. Furthermore, we also highlight fundamental prob-
lems of the chosen argumentation theories and thereby offer
ideas for future research on argumentation theory.
1. INTRODUCTION
Argumentation is a specific type of discourse often used
in daily life. The study of argumentation is crucial in many
areas of artificial intelligence and text processing research,
e.g. reasoning agents or discourse analysis. Machine learning
has been used to solve many problems of natural language
processing and therefore it is reasonable to think that it can
help to solve many of the problems encountered in argumen-
tation processing.
A good training corpus is a crucial part of applying any
machine learning technique. Therefore, the creation of ar-
gumentation corpora and its annotation process are crucial
steps in applying machine learning to argumentation pro-
cessing. However, nowadays few argumentation corpora ex-
ist and their development has not been studied in depth.
Therefore, it is not fully known how argumentation theories
should be applied and which difficulties can appear while
doing so.
This paper analyses the annotation process of argumenta-
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tion in legal documents. The legal field is an established and
interesting research area for argumentation analysis given
the central role of argumentation in the practice of law.
Furthermore, the study of argumentation in the legal field
is interesting because it enables to consider factors that go
beyond the very abstract, proof centred arguments of, for ex-
ample, mathematics, while retaining a certain formal struc-
ture, as against the rather anarchic arguments found in ev-
eryday conversation. The cases made by lawyers and the
decisions of judges provide, therefore, important examples
of written and spoken argumentation. Moreover, the study
of legal argumentation benefits all parties of a legal case,
favoring or improving applications such as the visualization
of argument structures and access to schemes for argument
building. Judges and juries can benefit from the study of le-
gal argumentation to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses
of the arguments used on both sides, and will be made more
aware of the quality and (non-)validity of their own argu-
mentation. Meanwhile the parties in a case can use these
applications to identify critical questions to ask their op-
posing parties and to anticipate in their arguments. It also
facilitates the process of finding precedents and can help im-
prove the quality of their own argumentation. Finally, the
annotation and its visualization can make judicial decisions
more easily comparable and accessible for all individuals.
The documents annotated in this study are legal cases
from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). We
analyse how the judges of this court present their argumen-
tation and argue that it can be a valid generalization of legal
argumentation made by different courts or judges. We study
the relation between this argumentation and well-known ar-
gumentation theories and we discuss the problems encoun-
tered during the annotation process, providing possible ex-
planations and solutions. The analysis of natural language
argumentation is difficult, not only for students, but also for
experts. To apply any argumentation theory, philosophical,
logical or dialectical, human annotators must deal, between
others, with the ambiguity of the theories, the conflicts be-
tween theorems, the ambiguity of the argumentation itself
and the existance of implicit information. Inevitably there
is also some subjectivity in the interpretation of the written
argument.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2
gives a general introduction to argumentation, paying spe-
cial attention to argumentation in legal cases. Section 3
presents a detailed description of the study on argumenta-
tion annotation. It starts with a description of the argu-
mentation framework used in the annotation, followed by
a description of the data set and the annotation methodol-
ogy. In section 4 the problems found during the annotation
process are discussed and some solutions analysed. Finally,
section 5 presents the main conclusions of this study and
some thoughts on future research.
2. ARGUMENTATION
Argumentation is the process by which arguments are
constructed, exchanged and evaluated in light of their in-
teractions with other arguments. An argument is a set of
premises, pieces of evidence (e.g. facts), offered in support
of a claim, called the conclusion. The conclusion is a propo-
sition, an idea which is either true or false, put forward by
somebody as true. Argumentation may also involve chains
of reasoning, where claims or conclusions are used in the
assumptions or premises for deriving further claims. The
following are possibe examples of argumentation:
• A PhD student, Susan, has spent more than five years
trying to finish her thesis, but there are problems. Her
advisers keep leaving town, and delays are continued.
She contemplates going to law school, where you can
get a degree in a definite period. But then she thinks:
“Well, I have put so much work into this thing. It
would be a pity to give up now.”
• The medical examiner (ME) said that the tissue sam-
ple found at the crime scene matches the DNA of the
suspect. Therefore, the tissue sample found at the
crime scene matches the DNA of the suspect.
• With the Moon’s gravity being just 1/6th of the Earth’s,
one might expect dust on the Moon to fall more slowly
than it does on Earth. However, the Moon has no at-
mosphere to speak of, and so the dust would actually
fall more quickly than on Earth.
Argumentation can play different roles depending on the aim
of the presenter of the arguments. For example, it can be
(i) factual argumentation, i.e. use just objective information
with the aim of informing the audience of some verifiable
information (e.g. scientific review), (ii) positional argumen-
tation, i.e. use of objective, subjective and hypothetical in-
formation with the aim of informing the audience of the pre-
senter’s beliefs (e.g. newspaper opinion article) or (iii) per-
suasional argumentation, i.e. use objective, subjective and
hypothetical information with the aim of persuading the au-
dience to do something [1]. We focus on the specific type of
argumentation used in legal cases and more specifically on
court decisions as it is described on the following subsection.
2.1 Argumentation in Legal Cases
A legal case is a dispute between opposing parties resolved
by a court, or by some equivalent legal process. The purpose
of legal argumentation is to “win” this dispute. A legal case
begins when a plaintiff files a claim. Although no techni-
cal forms of pleading are required, there is a basic structure
to every claim [5]. First, the plaintiff must allege certain
facts, and then state a conclusion of law that justifies the
relief being sought. The distinction between fact and law
is essential to the operation of the entire system. The de-
fendant, in turn, must file an answer. There are usually
[PREMISE It is indisputable that there is no common
ground on the question.] [PREMISE Although most of the
Contracting States do not expressly prohibit homosexuals
from adopting where single persons may adopt, it is not
possible to find in the legal and social orders of the Con-
tracting States uniform principles on these social issues on
which opinions within a democratic society may reason-
ably differ widely.] [CONCLUSION The Court considers
it quite natural that the national authorities, whose duty it
is in a democratic society also to consider, within the lim-
its of their jurisdiction, the interests of society as a whole,
should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation when they are
asked to make rulings on such matters ]
Figure 1: Example of a judicial argument
two possible answers: (i) deny the allegations of fact in the
plaintiff’s complaint; or (ii) assert additional facts which,
together with the necessary conclusions of law, would con-
stitute an affirmative defense to the plaintiff’s original claim.
At this point, though, nothing has yet happened that legal
experts would call an“argument”. There are only allegations
and denials. An argument will be created once the defen-
dant assumes that the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s
complaint are true, and yet still argue that the plaintiff’s le-
gal conclusions do not follow. Then, once the case proceeds
to trial, the judicial decision has to be taken. All the facts
and arguments from plaintiff and defendant are given to the
trier, e.g. a court, a commission, a judge or a jury. It is the
job of the trier to go over the complaints, the facts and the
allegations to determine the outcome of the case, i.e. to take
a judicial decision.
Judicial decisions are, therefore, made in cases of conflicts
before the law, where there exists dispute about what the
law means in a particular case. Subjects of law therefore
have a legitimate expectation that the trier who decides a
case comes to a motivated decision, based on sound argu-
mentation, rather than ad random statements. In general
there exists a particular duty for the deciding judge or court
to motivate their decision, a so-called duty to give reasons.
Therefore, judicial decisions are a perfect data set to find
well-structured and correct arguments. An example of ar-
gument from a judicial decision can be found in Figure 1.
3. ARGUMENTATION ANNOTATION
Argumentation annotation is dependent mainly on three
factors. First, the chosen argumentation theory or theories
which establish the “elements” to be annotated. Second,
the documents where the argumentation must be annotated.
And, third, the knowledge and experience of the persons
involved in the annotation process. This section presents
a detailed description of how these three aspects were ap-
proached during our annotation process. First, it details
the main characteristics of the ECHR legal procedure and
its documents, then the background and main characteris-
tics of the argumentation framework used on the annotation,
and finally, a general description of the annotators knowl-
edge, experience and working strategy.
3.1 Data
The set of documents selected for our corpus were ex-
tracted from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
human rights documentation (HUDOC)1 database of judg-
ments and decisions, which is available on CD-ROM and
online. We gathered a corpus of 45 judgments and deci-
sions from the CDs from August and December 2006. We
selected documents in English (the ECHR also offers French
translations).
3.1.1 ECHR Characteristics
The ECHR is the court watching over the application
of and compliance with European Convention on Human
Rights, a treaty to which 47 Council of Europe (COE) mem-
ber states, including the Russian Federation and Turkey, are
parties. As such it has jurisdiction over all these states in
matters regarding human rights. It is the highest court on
these matters and its judgments must be implemented in all
member states. For this reason alone, automated annotation
of a corpus of ECHR could have a wide field of application.
Both states and individuals can file complaints, and thus
act as plaintiffs or “applicants” in the Court’s jargon, but
only states can be tried as defendants, and are referred to as
“the goverment”. Previously there was also a Commission
which decided on admissibility of cases before the Court
could decide on the merits, but since 1998 the Court has
taken over the previous commission’s duties. However, our
corpus contains both admissibility decisions and judgments
on the merits, from both the previous commission and the
Court, so that it allows to work with all ECHR cases, i.e.
past, present and future.
An important factor in choosing this court was that the
ECHR, in the years since its installment several decades ago,
has developed its own patterns of reasoning, using specific
structures and types of argumentation. Because of the direct
applicability of its judgments in all COE member states,
many of these patterns have been taken over by judges and
courts at the national level. These patterns took some time
to develop but occur in most documents from after 1985,
which is the large majority. However, we have also selected
some of the cases before that date, to have a better overview
of the problems. This, of course, leads to a more difficult
automatic classification but makes the corpus statistically
representative.
The final reasons for selecting this corpus were: (a) the
ECHR covers whole of Europe in an important field, i.e. hu-
man rights, (b) the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has
been known to use some of the same patterns of reasoning
and has taken over some others from the ECHR, (c) there
is also an ongoing process to make the European Union
party to the Convention which will make this corpus all
the more significant, (d) the Inter-American and African
regional human rights treaties have installed courts very
similar in structure to the ECHR, using some of the same
phrasing and reasoning patterns as the ECHR, and (e) sev-
eral constitutional courts use discursive expressions similar
to those used by the ECHR.
3.1.2 Document Structure
The main structure of these documents contains a header
providing information about the case (e.g. application num-
ber, names of the plaintiffs or applicants, defendant (the gov-
ernment) and members of the Court involved in the case),
followed by a set of summaries on the main facts of the
1http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-
Law/HUDOC/HUDOC+database/
case, previous decisions of this court on the current case,
previous steps of the applicant before this court and com-
plaints. Then follows the court’s decision process, which
often starts with the scope of the case moving on to discuss
one or more complaints or allegations of violation. Usually
the documents conclude with separate dissenting or concur-
ring opinions of one or more of the judges.
The decision of the court is presented at the end of the
section The Law, sometimes also called As to the Law. This
decision can be just a statement establishing the admissi-
bility of the case or a set of statements establishing which
violations occurred and which amounts to pay per pecuniary
and non-pecuniary damage. The rest of The Law presents
the argumentation of the court by which it arrived at its
decision and a recompilation of arguments previously pre-
sented to it by the applicant and defendant. This section
is where the judicial decision is taken place and therefore,
where most of the arguments of the legal case are found.
3.1.3 Discourse Structure
The ECHR discourse also shows a typical structure. The
court’s discourse is influenced by its internal working pro-
cess. As in typical case law (see subsection 2.1) the process
goes as follows. First, the applicant, usually an individual,
makes his or her case, lists the articles on which the case is
based, lists the facts and argues why these facts violate the
cited articles. Then, the defendant or government defends
its case offering its interpretation of facts and rules and of
the way facts relate to those rules. Then the court analyses
all the complaints and arguments provided by both parties
and offers its written argumentation, including its evaluation
of the parties’ arguments, and decision.
It is important to notice that for nearly each complaint
of the applicant or defendant presented to the court, the
court offers an “independent” argumentation and decision.
Once all the complaints have been evaluated, and all the
decisions have been argumented, the court presents a final
decision that depends on those middle decisions and possibly
some other statements not directly related to any of the
complaints.
Each of these independent argumentations has also a typ-
ical structure. Firstly, the arguments of both applicants and
defendants are summarized and presented in past tense. We
call these arguments reported arguments, as their argumen-
tative function was only relevant previously, in the docu-
ments presented to the court by both parties. Their current
function is just to report that this argumentation existed.
Secondly, the court presents its evaluation of the reported
arguments, sometimes validating them but sometimes also
presenting new arguments. These parts of the court’s dis-
course is what we understand as the current argumentation.
Finally, the conclusion of the argumentation is presented.
3.1.4 Reasoning Structure
The ECHR also uses certain specific patterns of argumen-
tation that are more often used in the decision making pro-
cess. This section presents some of them. First, an applicant
must always present a complaint about the violation of a spe-
cific article of law from the Convention. This will prompt the
court to use the scheme of Argument from Established Rule
to prove or disprove the validity of the complaint. Normally
this is the “top” argument of a chain of arguments. Second,
given that the ECHR is a court which relies on its previ-
The Court recalls that it falls to each Contracting State,
with its responsibility for “the life of [its] nation”, to de-
termine whether that life is threatened by a “public emer-
gency”and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting
to overcome the emergency. By reason of their direct and
continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment,
the national authorities are in principle better placed than
the international judge to decide both on the presence of
such an emergency and on the nature and scope of the
derogations necessary to avert it. Accordingly, in this mat-
ter a wide margin of appreciation should be left to the
national authorities.
Figure 2: Example of an argument from position to
know in the ECHR
ous decisions in so-called precedent cases for the interpreta-
tion of the Convention, it is also quite common to see the
court use the scheme of Argument from Precedent to justify
its decision. This often in combination with the Argument
from Established Rule as the precedent establishes the rule.
Third, when applying an article it isn’t always immediately
clear which is its scope and whether it applies to the facts
currently under review. Therefore, the court also presents
a recurrent use of the scheme Argument of Verbal Classifi-
cation, again often in combination with the Argument from
Established Rule. Fourth, the Argument from Position to
Know is regularly used by the ECHR not in cases of witness
testimony or expert opinion, or even of de jure authority,
but in a pattern of argumentation that is specific and typical
to the ECHR and which has attracted wide attention and
sometimes following, for example from other international
human rights courts, from federal constitutional courts, and
from those who study them - like commentators of the US
Supreme Court. This pattern of argumentation is called the
“margin of appreciation doctrine” and embodies the princi-
ple that there can be a certain moral or cultural relativism
in the application of human rights. The pattern then always
includes the Court’s assertion that “local authorities are, in
principle, better placed” to assess what is acceptable to the
society in question and what is the best way to implement
certain human rights in the particular circumstances of the
country and culture, see Figure 2.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
The first step, and perhaps the most important, in the
creation of any corpus is to determine the information that
should be preserved. Argumentation corpora are not differ-
ent, they need to define which elements form the argumen-
tation and how they related between each other, i.e. decide
which argumentation theory should apply.
Argumentation theory has witnessed three decades of re-
markable flowering, a proliferation of theoretical insights,
where each has been developed in contradistinction to the
others [2]. It’s not that theorists have been insular. On
the contrary, they have for the most part proceeded with
a thorough and accurate knowledge of activities from other
theorists, even borrowing cuttings from one another (for ex-
ample Walton from Pragma-Dialectics [10]) or digging to-
gether (for example, van Eemeren and Grootendorst with
Jackson and Jacobs [8]).
Our study uses two well-known argumentation theories,
argumentation schemes and pragma-dialectics. This frame-
Figure 3: Simple Argumentation Structure
Figure 4: Multiple Argumentation Structure
work is not the only one, nor the most important of ar-
gumentation, but its characteristics were found the most
needed for the final purpose of the corpus here presented.
3.2.1 Pragma-dialectics
The first theory approaches argumentation from the pragma-
dialectical and rhetorical view [7]. It describes argumenta-
tion as a phenomenon of verbal communication which should
be studied as a specific mode of discourse, characterized by
the use of language for resolving a difference of opinion. Ac-
cording to pragma-dialectical theory, argumentation is al-
ways part of an explicit or implicit dialogue in which one
party attempts to convince the other party of the acceptabil-
ity of his standpoint. In a fully explicit dialogue, the antag-
onist expresses his doubts and criticisms unequivocally, and
all these doubts and criticisms must be answered by the pro-
tagonist by advancing more argumentation. In an implicit
dialogue where the antagonist is silent, the protagonist can
only anticipate the antagonist’s doubts or criticism; he will
only advance more argumentation if he assumes that doubts
or criticism are to be expected. In a dialogical approach to
argumentation, the discussion character of the proceedings
is deemed to be reflected in the structure of the argumen-
tation. The protagonist’s argumentation is then seen as a
complex whole made up of statements put forward to deal
with real or anticipated critical reactions from an antagonist
There exist different ways of putting forward statements
for the argumentation:
1. Simple Argumentation: one defense of a stand-
point. See Figure 3.
2. Multiple Argumentation: alternative defenses of
the same standpoint. See Figure 4.
3. Compound Argumentation: a chain of arguments
that reinforce each other.
Figure 5: Coordinate Argumentation Structure
Figure 6: Subordinate Argumentation Structure
(a) Coordinatively Compound Argumentation
is when the arguments constituting the chain are
“connected in parallel”. Then, the arguments are
part of a combined attempt to defend the stand-
point. See Figure 5.
(b) Subordinatively Compound Argumentation
is when the arguments in the chain are“connected
in series”, the one supporting the other. See Fig-
ure 6.
This theory has been applied to understand several differ-
ent types of argumentative discourse. For example, it has
been used to analyze and evaluate legal argumentation, me-
diation, negotiation, (parliamentary) debate, interpersonal
argumentation, political argumentation, health communica-
tion and visual argumentation. Therefore, its relevance for
the analysis of written argumentation is more than proved.
3.2.2 Argumentation Schemes
The second theory used on pur framework background is
known as argumentation schemes [9, 12] and has attracted
increasing interest from argumentation theorists. Argumen-
tation schemes offer a means of characterising stereotypi-
cal patterns of reasoning. They are the forms of argument
(structures of inference) that enable one to identify and eval-
uate common types of argumentation in everyday discourse.
Matching each argumentation scheme, a set of critical
questions is given. The critical questions are questions that
can be asked (or assumptions that are held) by which a non-
deductive argument based on a scheme might be judged to
be (or presented as being) good or fallacious. The critical
questions form a vital part of the definition of a scheme, and
are one of the benefits of adopting a scheme-based approach.
The argumentation scheme and the matching critical ques-
tions are used to evaluate a given argument in a particular
case, in relation to a context of dialogue in which the argu-
ment occurred. An argument used in a given case is eval-
uated by judging the weight of evidence on both sides at
the given point in the case where the argument was used.
If all the premises are supported by some weight of evi-
dence, then that weight of acceptability is shifted towards
the conclusion, subject to rebuttal by the asking of appro-
priate critical questions.
One crucial aspect, then, of developing applications of ar-
gumentation schemes - computational and otherwise - is to
capture these critical questions in an appropriate way. Thus,
the complete set of premises employed in a scheme is the
union of those given as premises and (the propositional con-
tent of) those listed as critical questions. The distinction
and overlap between premises and critical questions may
therefore be unclear, especially as critical questions might
be anticipated in the premises by the arguer.
The number of argumentation schemes remains indefinite
as new schemes are found regularly. In [9] Walton presented
the twenty-five most common argumentation schemes. Ear-
lier authors [6] identified many distinctive kinds of argu-
ments used to convince a respondent on a provisional basis
and [3] made an even more systematic taxonomy by listing
some of these schemes, along with useful examples of them.
More recently, Walton has elaborated further on his first list
of schemes in the specificity of the legal context [11] and has
defined a more detailed classification of different schemes in
[12].
Argumentation scheme theory is a good basis for the anal-
ysis of written argumentation, specially on the legal domain,
as it allows to model reasoning forms of argument where the
argument is used to fulfill a probative function whereby pro-
bative weight is transferred from the premises to the conclu-
sion. The probative weight is defeasible, i.e. its function is to
tilt a balance of considerations on an ultimate issue in a dia-
logue to one side or the other. This means that the schemes
offer one way of tackling the fact that arguments tradionally
categorized as fallacies seem to be appropiate and accept-
able under the right circumstances. Furthermore, in judicial
decisions, as in all legal argumentation, the quality of the ar-
gument is very important. Therefore, classification in types
of argumentation is useful for identifying problematic types
of argumentation, which are often associated with fallacies.
A possible example is the ad hominem argument which is
often used by plaintiffs and defendants but ought not to be
considered by those judging the case [11].
3.2.3 Our Framework
The aim of our annotation was to create a corpus that
could be used to learn the argumentation structure of a
document, i.e. to detect the different arguments of the ar-
gumentation, their relations and the different statements of
each argument. Therefore, the choice was made to clas-
sify the discourse relations between arguments following the
pragma-dialectical approach, i.e. as coordinative, subordi-
native or multiple. On the other hand, each argument was
classified following the argumentation schemes theory. We
made the assumption that all the premises inside a scheme
are necessary, i.e. have coordinative relations. The critical
questions can be found explicitly or implicitly but still they
are also necessary for the argumentation, and therefore, if
Table 1: Examples of the most common argumentation schemes encountered on the ECHR corpus
Argument from Sign The Commission observes that whereas in his original application the applicant stated
that his house was burnt down on January 1994, it appears that the incident under
investigation by the public prosecutor of Kulp district and the Kulp District Adminis-
trative Board occurred on November 1993. In these circumstances , the question arises
whether the complaints insofar as they relate to specific acts carried out on November
1993 have been introduced out of time , given that the application was introduced on
June 1993
Argument from Example There will always be a need for elucidation of doubtful points and for adaptation to
changing circumstances. Indeed, in the United Kingdom, as in the other Convention
States, the progressive development of the criminal law through judicial law-making is
a well entrenched and necessary part of legal tradition.
Argument from Consequences It is not always an easy matter to trace the dividing line between procedural and sub-
stantive limitations of a given entitlement under domestic law. It may sometimes be
no more than a question of legislative technique whether the limitation is expressed
in terms of the right or its remedy. In the present case, the Court does not consider
it necessary to settle the question of the precise nature of the defence of privilege for
the purposes of Article para . art. , since it is devoid of significance in the particular
circumstances.If the Court were to treat the facts underlying the complaints declared
admissible by the Commission as raising a substantive, rather than a procedural, com-
plaint going to the right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention
(...) the same central issues of legitimate aim and proportionality as under Article 8
para. 2 would be posed.
Argument from Analogy The Court recalls its decision in the case of Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom
(...) that a period of detention without judicial control of four days and six hours fell
outside the strict constraints as to time permitted by Article 6 (...) It clearly follows
that the period of fourteen or more days during which Mr Aksoy was detained without
being brought before a judge or other judicial officer did not satisfy the requirement of
“promptness”.
Argument from an Established
Rule
The Court is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and must be cautious in taking
on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable
by the circumstances of a particular case (...). Where domestic proceedings have taken
place, it is not the Court’s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of
the domestic authorities and, as a general rule, it is for those authorities to assess the
evidence before them (...). Though the Court is not bound by the latter’s findings, in
normal circumstances it requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings
of fact they have reached (...)
Argument from Precedent The Commission observes that Article 26 of the Convention “should be applied with
some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism; it is sufficient that the
complaints intended to be made subsequently before the Convention organs should
have been raised at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements
and time-limits laid down in domestic law”((...)Castells judgment of 23 April 1992 (...)).
(...) The Commission considers that the applicant did invoke before the Greek courts,
at least in substance, the complaints relating to Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention
which he now puts to the Commision. He may therefore be said to have exhausted
domestic remedies. The Commission concludes that the applicant has complied with
the requirements of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.
they are explicit they are treated as premises also holding
coordinate relations.
Our study started two years ago and, as [12] was not yet
available, it was based on a previous study [9]. The list of
25 argumentation schemes presented by Walton in [9] was
slightly altered for application to our corpus. First, we in-
cluded some subtypes, which were also mentioned in [9] but
not added to its final list, like (a) the argument from fal-
sification of a hypothesis in addition to the argument from
evidence to a hypothesis, (b) the argument from popular
practice in addition to the argument from popularity, (c)
the negative ethotic argument in addition to the (positive)
ethotic argument, and (d) the argument from an exceptional
case in addition to the argument from an established rule.
We assumed this would make it easier for humans to identify
types or argumentation. We also added another argument
elaborated in [9] but also not added to its final list of ar-
guments, the arguments from ignorance. Finally, we left off
the list all of the slippery slope arguments (causal, prece-
dent, verbal and full), because, as Walton notes, they are all
combinations of the argument from gradualism with other
types of argument (verbal classification, precedent, popu-
larity, etc.). This was done to prevent conflicts between
annotations, where one annotator might choose a slippery
slope argument while the other might choose a combination
of different arguments.
Table 2: Argumentation Schemes found on our framework
Argumentation Scheme % Occurrences in dataset % Incorrect annotation
Argument from Sign 7.9 7.2
Argument from Example 5.2 2.4
Argument from Verbal Classification 4.7 5.1
Argument from Commitment 0.6 0
Circumstantial Argument Against the Person 0 0
Argument from Position to Know 2.1 2.3
Argument from Expert Opinion 2.7 0
Argument from Evidence to a Hypothesis 0.3 0
Argument from Falsification of a Hypothesis 4.2 0
Argument from Correlation to Cause 1.1 1.7
Argument from Cause to Effect 4.7 10.6
Argument from Consequences 8.2 5.4
Argument from Analogy 21.6 25.4
Argument from Waste 2.3 0
Argument from Popularity 1.2 0
Argument from Popular Practice 2.4 2.2
Ethotic Argument 0 0
Negative Ethotic Argument 0.3 0
Argument from Bias 0 0
Argument from an Established Rule 19.6 28.0
Argument from an Exceptional Case 0.4 1.7
Argument from Precedent 6.1 1.7
Argument from Gradualism 4.4 6.3
Argument from Vagueness of a Verbal Classification 0 0
Argument from Arbitrariness of a Verbal Classification 0 0
Argument from Ignorance 0 0
In later studies Walton approaches the schemes in the
specific context of legal argumentation [11]. Then, Walton
asserts that the argument from position to know includes
often as subtypes the argument from witness testimony and
the argument from expert opinion, among others. These
types of arguments are common in legal argumentation and
it seems they should be added to our list. However, it was
decided not to add them but to include guidelines for the an-
notators specifying these as subtypes of the argument from
position to know. This was done to keep the classification
scheme general enough for application to ordinary language
argumentation, outside the legal field. Walton also stated
in [11] that the argument from precedent is a subtype of the
argument from analogy. However, we did not remove the ar-
gument from precedent from our list of arguments. The rep-
resentations of argument from analogy and argument from
precedent encounter in our corpus were clearly distinctive,
so the sub-classification did not present a problem to our
annotators.
After all the modifications on the starting schemes list, we
were left with the list of argumentation schemes shown in
Table 2. Note that the selected argumentation schemes are
the ones we expect to find in the ECHR legal cases. How-
ever, the experimental study cannot assure the completeness
or correcteness of this list due to the limited number of in-
volved cases. Still, it gives good indication of which schemes
are generally used in the ECHR legal cases. Table 1 presents
examples of the most common schemes.
3.3 Annotators
For the annotation task we have selected two sets of anno-
tators, each of them formed by two persons, and a “judge”
to solve disagreements between annotators. The first set
of annotators was formed by two lawyers, a European and
non-European, both studying their second master degree.
They had previous knowledge on argumentation detection,
achieved working by different legal firms. However, these
experiences did not include argumentation analysis or good
knowledge of argumentation theories. The second set of an-
notators, were both European, but on the contrary, were
given a specific training on argumentation theories, argu-
mentation analysis and the type of argumentation done in
the ECHR. All the annotators were required to read [10] and
to attend a couple of meetings to discuss and clarify their
doubts about the argumentation theories and the annotation
process. The“judge”used on disagreement discussions has a
deep knowledge on argumentation theories, specially argu-
mentation schemes, and has worked for more than four years
with ECHR legal cases analysis. All the annotators worked
individually during five weeks. The annotations were after-
wards analysed by the judge who chose for each set of anno-
tators which of the two annotations, done by the annotators
of the set, was the most correct.
4. DISCUSSION
Although the different theories used as a background frame-
work were combined, slightly adapted and provided with
additional guidelines to facilitate human annotation of the
corpus, inevitably there remained some conflicts between the
different annotations. Some of these conflicts were due sim-
ple causes such as lack of concentration from the annotators
or misinterpretation of the ECHR language. There is no
solution for the first cause and the solution for the second
only affects the source of the annotated data not our an-
notation process. However, there were other disagreements
which demand a discussion on the annotaion process, its
framework and the background theories. This section pro-
vides an overview of the most common conflicts cause, and,
whenever it is possible, we give an explanation or solution
for those conflicts.
4.1 Critical Questions
The treatment of critical questions in the annotation pro-
cess is one of the main dicussion points given our chosen
framework. Critical questions are important tools for the
evaluation of argumentation when working with argumenta-
tion schemes. In the ECHR they figure as premises, either
implicit or explicit, in the argumentation of both parties,
either in anticipation of critical questions from the counter-
party (this is usually the case for the applicant’s argumenta-
tion) or in answer to the critical questions from the counter-
party (which is usually the case for the government). In the
Court’s argumentation, critical questions sometimes occur in
the evaluation of so-called“reported argument”from the par-
ties and they also figure as implicit and/or explicit premises
in the Court’s own (“current”) argumentation. Therefore,
the annotation of the critical questions could present a prob-
lem when working only over “normal” arguments. However,
our choice to separate “reported arguments” from the other
arguments facilitates the identification of the critical ques-
tions that have been answered in the premises and those
that have not been answered, which in turn helps identify
the arguments that can be criticized.
4.2 Identifying Argumentation
The first substantial disagreement between annotations
deals with those propositions in the documents that should
be identified as argumentation but are not. This disagree-
ment is due three main reasons, which we analyse in detail
over the next sub-sections.
4.2.1 Reported Argument
The first disagreement cause is due to the special charac-
teristiques of the ECHR, and more specifically to fact that
the Court reports, evaluates and discards or endorses the
arguments of the applicant (plaintiff) and the state (defen-
dant) which precede its judgment. Some annotators count
these reported arguments as argumentation, others do not.
The former were either incapable of distinguishing between
the two types of argumentation or understood argumenta-
tion to be all argumentation, whereas the latter understood
argumentation to be only the current argumentation by the
Court itself. This problem is solved by letting the anno-
tators mark reported-argument as such, in addition to dis-
secting its structure and classifying its type. The advantage
of annotating reported argument is that it shows how law
is a discursive/dialectical practice, and that critical ques-
tions for the previously offered arguments can be identified,
enabling readers to evaluate the Court’s evaluation of those
arguments by checking whether all relevant critical questions
were answered in the premises.
4.2.2 Argumentation or Fact?
The second disagreement cause is, so we believe, due to
different conceptions of law held by the respective anno-
tators. [4] suggests that the positivist conception of the
law, still taught in many law schools, is challenged by the-
ories of legal reasoning which highlight the argumentative
aspects of legal decisionmaking. Our hypothesis is that,
in our study, we are possibly confronted with something of
a reverse mechanism, where someone holding a positivist
conception of law does not identify as much argumentation
in legal decisions. It is difficult to fully confirm this pre-
sumption, but two elements nevertheless seem to support it.
First, we do know that the annotator who identified the least
arguments had enjoyed a strongly positivism-oriented legal
training, whereas another of the annotators, who we know
had a firm background in both legal theory and argumenta-
tion theory, identified more argumentative propositions than
either all the other lawyers together did. Second, the major-
ity of the argumentative clauses that remained undetected
were classified by the other annotators as Arguments from
Precedent or Analogy. The second most commonly non-
detected type of argument was the Argument from Estab-
lished Rule. It is common for legal positivists to count rules
of law, in whichever way established, be it by statute or
precedent, as “facts” in their ontology. Possibly, then, the
non-identification of arguments from established rule and
precedent points to such a positivist ontology in the anno-
tator’s (implicit) conception of law.
4.2.3 Limits of the Argument
The third disagreement cause presented itself in the form
of premises going undetected by certain annotators. This
occurs most often in Arguments from an Established Rule.
We believe this relates to the fact that the general overar-
ching argument of a judicial decision is one from established
rule, with premises to the final conclusion scattered all over
the text of the document. These scattered premises are most
difficult to detect. We believe there are two reasons for this:
(a) the larger the distance between a premise and its con-
clusion, the harder it is to acknowledge their relation and
(b) the larger the distance between premise and conclusion,
the higher the chance of human error, e.g. oblivion or lack
of concentration. Even if there is no real solution to human
errors, it is expected that automatic detection and visualiza-
tion of argumentation will be of great service in making the
structure of those complex arguments from an established
rule more easily accessible to readers.
4.3 Identifying the Structure of the Argumen-
tation
A second substantial disagreement between annotators
arises from the structure attributed to the detected argu-
mentative propositions. There are three main causes for this
diagreement, which we discuss in the following sub-sections.
4.3.1 Distinguishing Premises from Conclusions
In the earliest annotations, disagreements commonly arise
concerning the nature of argumentative clauses, that is on
the question of whether an argumentative clause was a premise
or a conclusion. The reason is, once more, that the reason-
ing of the Court usually takes the form of one or more large,
complex and multilayered arguments from an established
rule, leading to one or several simple conclusions concerning
the violation of an article of law. Therefore, there are only
few “pure” conclusions, with a large number of subordina-
tive, coordinative and multiple arguments leading to it, the
premises of which can in turn be the conclusions of other
arguments. In this way a reasonably large percentage of the
premises are also conclusions to foregoing arguments, which
explains the high ratio of disagreement between the first two
annotators as they lacked familiarity with the ECHR’s char-
acteristics. The only way to solve this problem is to better
train the annotators and make them aware of the specific
overall argumentation structure of the documents to be an-
notated previous to starting the annotation process. This
strategy was succesfully carried out with the second set of
annotators.
4.3.2 Identifying the Structure of Complex Argument
The second cause of disagreement on argument structure
presented itself, in almost two thirds of the cases, with the
premises or conclusions of Arguments from Established Rule:
what was identified as a premise by one annotator was identi-
fied as a conclusion by the other and vice versa. Also, almost
half of the cases in which super-arguments, sub-arguments or
co-arguments were left undetected or in which subordinative
arguments were mistakenly identified as coordinative argu-
ments, an Argument from Established Rule or an Argument
from Gradualism was concerned - two types or argument
which are likely to be complexly structured. Again, as most
of the complex overarching arguments in the ECHR’s deci-
sions are arguments from established rule, scattered some-
times over several pages of text - it need not surprise that
the structure of these particular arguments was most diffi-
cult to detect, for the similar reasons as cited in the section
4.2.3: the larger the distance between different elements of
an argument, (a) the more difficult it is to acknowledge their
relation and (b) the larger the chance of human error. There
is no real solution for this problem, but visualization will
make argument structures more easily accessible.
4.3.3 Subordinative or Coordinative?
The third and last cause of disagreement due to argument
structure is also related to complex arguments, but this time
to the overarching complex argument. As stated before,
many sub-, super- and co-arguments were left undetected,
and lots of coordinative and subordinative premises met the
same fate. Most importantly, subordinative arguments were
sometimes wrongly annotated as coordinative, and the other
way around, whereas the difference should not be too diffi-
cult to understand. In both cases there is a chain of premises
(say, more than two) working together and leading to a con-
clusion but in the case of subordinative premises the chain
is serial and one could place the premises in a logical order
that cannot be altered, or the argument would loose mean-
ing. In the case of coordinative premises, the order of the
premises would not necessarily make much difference as they
work parallel to eachother. Also in a subordinative structure
there can be different types of argument, though this is not
necessarily the case. When the premises are coordinative
there is only one argument and therefore only one possible
argument scheme. There are many reasons for this type of
error, e.g. the argument presents an incorrect or unclear dis-
course structure (the ECHR judges stated their standpoints
not enough clearly) or on the other hand it could be that the
annotators needed a more exhaustive training in this type
of complex arguments.
4.4 Identifying the Type of Argument or Ar-
gumentation Scheme
The third disagreement between annotators is non-corpus
related, but argumentation theory related. The annotators
had difficulties identifying the correct argument type, i.e. the
argumentation scheme that was most suitable to the argu-
ment reasoning. The two main reasons for this disagreement
are discussed in detail in the next sub-sections.
4.4.1 The Argument from Gradualism. Type or Struc-
ture?
The argument from gradualism proved particularly diffi-
cult to detect. Annotators frequently disagreed on what was
an argument from gradualism. In almost all cases of con-
flict, one of the annotators saw gradualism while another
would see different types of argument, and thus different ar-
guments, in a subordinative structure. This raised the fol-
lowing question: is gradualism not simply another term for a
subordinative structure of argumentation, as Walton admit-
ted to be the case for the “slippery slope” argument schemes
in [9]? Our choice to use a framework in which chains of
premises are either broken up into chains of separate, sub-
ordinate arguments or, if listed as one argument, presumed
to be coordinative (see section 3.2) only complicated this
issue. In this framework there is no place for subordina-
tive arguments from gradualism. But can arguments from
gradualism be coordinative?
Walton describes the argument from gradualism as con-
sisting of a chain of premises but does not explicitly say
whether it is subordinative or coordinative in structure. Yet
he admits in [9] that this type of argument can also be un-
derstood as a strategy or tactic of argumentation. In other
words it can be understood to describe how chains of sub-
ordinative argument can best be built in certain cases, by
gradually augmenting and shifting the weight of probabil-
ity. The visual representation given there, gives the same
impression of subordinative argument as the premises are
listed serially, one supporting the other. However, he also
says that sometimes gradualism is used as distinctive type
of argumentation - the example given argues for a gradual
introduction of taxes as this will be more easily acceptable
for the population. Questions arise as to whether this is not
rather a combination of arguments from consequences and
popular acceptance, but these questions aside, the key in-
gredients to a “real” argument from gradualism seem to be
(a) the fact that one of the premises does not lead to the
conclusion by itself, the other premises are also needed for
the conclusion to gain probability and (b) an element of aug-
mentation, of gradually increasing the weight of probability.
In fact, in our corpus, the annotators found few examples
of arguments which seemed to be non-subordinative, hence
assumed to be coordinative, which could not be classified as
any other type of argument and which carried an element
of gradualism and there was disagreement on almost all of
these examples between annotators. Therefore, the question
of whether the argument from gradualism is really a type of
argument and not rather a strategy or structure remains,
evidently, in need of further theoretical elaboration.
4.4.2 Classification of Schemes
The last conflict between annotations is a conflict between
two types of argumentation which in fact belong to the same
general class according to [12]. For example, conflict oc-
curred between an argument from correlation and an argu-
ment from cause to effect, both classified as causal reasoning,
between an argument from sign and an argument from evi-
dence to hypothesis, both classified as abductive reasoning,
and between arguments from (lack of) analogy and argu-
ments from established rule (or exception to it), both argu-
ments applying rules to cases according to [12]. This seems
to imply that it is easier for humans to detect more general
classes of argumentation than it is for them to identify the
more specific types.
It must also be noted that in cases of “negative” argumen-
tation schemes, where the argumentation scheme was used
negatively, for example to say that an analogy or established
rule did not apply, annotators would wrongly pick a negative
argumentation scheme on the list belonging to the same class
(i.c. argument from exceptional case) instead of the correct
argumentation scheme which was used negatively (i.c. ar-
gument from analogy) but of which the “negative” was not
in our list of choices.
This reinforces the idea that more general classes of argu-
mentation are easier to detect and also suggests that nega-
tive argumentation schemes should be kept off the list or, al-
ternatively, that a negative should be added to each positive
argumentation scheme. Therefore, we support the classifica-
tion of argumentation schemes into broader classes, as done
in [12], and would advise those creating corpuses to let an-
notators select the general class of argumentation first and
only clear out the specific details later. On this basis, “path-
ways of classification”, in the form of a real taxonomic hier-
archy, could be drawn up, leading annotators to the correct
detailed argumentation scheme by way of answering simple
taxonomic questions.
After all this is how both humans actually pinpoint types
of argumentation and it would save AI-applications a consid-
erable amount of time in classifying argumentation as they
would not have to run through a list of 60 possible types,
choosing the first one possible applicable, but would come
to a more correct classification in few steps.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Our attempt to adapt well-known argumentation theories
for the annotation of real case law argumentation shows sig-
nificant problems with both the theories and the real argu-
ment’s s construction. Some of these problems were presum-
ably due to the annotators themselves, for example to their
background conceptions about the ontology of law. How-
ever, sometimes the theory itself was also not sufficiently
clear, like in the case of the argument from gradualism.
While other times, the arguments themselves were difficult
to pinpoint right away, leading to the need for more general
classification systems and classification pathways. In conclu-
sion, our research allows to highlight the importance of the
continued study of argumentation, to clarify the relationship
between legal and argumentation theory, the relationship be-
tween the structure and type of argumentation and to draw
up classification systems and pathways for natural language
argumentation.
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